We show that when …rms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also …nd some su¢ cient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries.
Introduction
The Cournot model is widely used in studies of imperfectly competitive industries.
Its standard version, which is concerned with the case of …rms producing a homogeneous good with complete information about demand and production costs, has been extensively studied. However, in the past thirty years a fairly big amount of research has been dedicated to questions that arise when the information is incomplete, i.e., when there is uncertainty about the market demand and/or the …rms'cost functions, and …rms have asymmetric information about them. (See, e.g., Gal-Or (1985 ), Raith (1996) , Sakai (1985 Sakai ( , 1986 , Shapiro (1986) , Vives (1984 Vives ( , 1988 Vives ( , 1999 , and Einy et al (2002, 2003) .)
In oligopolies with incomplete information, some of the questions that have been addressed concern the value of information to a …rm (that is, whether and by how much a …rm can bene…t from receiving additional information), as well as …rms' incentives to share information. Treating these questions involves comparisons of the pure strategy Bayesian Cournot equilibrium outcomes in industries that di¤er with respect to the information endowments of the …rms. The scope of these exercises is thus limited to classes of industries for which an equilibrium exists. 1 Moreover, sharp and general conclusions are hard to obtain unless an equilibrium is also unique under various information endowments of the …rms.
For a complete information oligopoly, the conditions for existence of a Cournot equilibrium that are found following the topological approach guarantee that the best response correspondences of the …rms are closed graphed and convex-valued. For instance, if the inverse demand is a decreasing concave function, and …rms' cost functions are convex, then a …rm's payo¤ is a concave function of its own output, and under standard continuity assumptions the Nash Theorem yields equilibrium existence (see Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) ). In general, mere quasi-concavity of each …rm's payo¤ in its own output and continuity of …rms'payo¤ functions su¢ ce to obtain existence.
An alternative approach to establishing existence of a Cournot equilibrium in the 1 Throughout the paper we restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. Existence of a mixed strategy Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly does not present a problem under either complete or incomplete information (see remark 6 in Einy et al (2007)), and will not be taken as an issue here.
complete information case is to study conditions under which …rms'output decisions are strategic substitutes, i.e., the best response correspondence of a …rm is decreasing in the output of the other …rms. This feature together with the aggregation property of …rms' payo¤s (i.e., a …rm's payo¤ depends only on its own output and on the aggregate output of all other …rms) imply that the composite best response correspondence has a …xed point. This approach was pioneered by Novshek (1985) , who establishes existence of equilibrium under a quite general condition on the inverse demand, and with minimal assumptions (monotonicity and continuity) on costs.
Novshek's condition on the inverse demand requires that the marginal revenue of a …rm be a decreasing function of the aggregate output of the other …rms, and this indeed implies that …rms'outputs are strategic substitutes.
Novshek's work spurred later developments (see Vives (1990) , Kukushkin (1994) , Amir (1996) ), which adopted the lattice-theoretic framework and tools to study conditions for strategic substitutes and for existence of …xed points. (We may thus term this method of establishing equilibrium existence the lattice approach.) Vives (1990) noted that Novshek's condition is equivalent to the (cardinal) submodularity of the payo¤ function of each …rm in its own output and on the aggregate output of other …rms. Amir (1996) shows that log-concavity of the inverse demand ensures by itself that payo¤ functions are (ordinally) submodular 2 . Since both types of submodularity imply strategic substitutes, existence of equilibrium in a duopoly can be established using Tarski's …xed point theorem. 3 Existence of equilibrium in oligopolies with more than two …rms can be established using a more sophisticated …xed-point theorem due
to Kukushkin (1994) .
In oligopolies with incomplete information, the issues of existence of a (pure strategy) Bayesian Cournot equilibrium have been largely bypassed in the literature by making strong assumptions. For instance, Gal-Or (1985) , Vives (1984 Vives ( , 1988 , and Raith (1999) assume that the market demand is uncertain and linear, and allow the possibility that negative prices may arise for large outputs, in order not to break the linearity of the demand function. In other works (see, e.g., Sakai (1985) ), incomplete information is assumed only on …rms' linear costs, which again allows to avoid the 2 More preceisely, each …rm's payo¤ function satis…es the condition of reverse single crossing property of Amir (1996) with respect to its own output and the aggregate output of the other …rms. 3 See, theorems 1.1 and 1.2, and corollary 2.2, respectively, in Amir (1996) .
general problem of equilibrium existence. In a non-linear setting, Einy et al (2003) derive conditions under which the value of public information in an oligopoly is either positive or negative, but assume that the …rms are symmetrically informed, which allows to reduce the equilibrium existence question to that in a complete information oligopoly. The assumption of symmetry of information, and a reduction to the complete information case that it allows, also stand behind the existence result of Lagerlöf (2006) . In Einy et al (2002) a categorical approach is used: it is assumed that an equilibrium exists, and then its properties are investigated.
In this work we study conditions under which a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium exists, and is unique, in an oligopoly with incomplete information. As noted, quasiconcavity and ordinal submodularity are two very general properties of the payo¤ functions that are conducive to equilibrium existence in the complete information case. In the incomplete information scenario, however, if these properties are assumed to hold state-by-state, then they do not usually imply the corresponding properties of the expected payo¤ function. We thus con…ne ourselves to conditions on the primitives of the model that imply stronger properties of the payo¤ functions in each state (convexity or cardinal submodularity), at least on a certain range of output levels.
We will assume that prices are non-negative in every state of nature. (A model in which prices may be negative in some states of nature is less appealing; in section 4, however, we consider this case as well.) Requiring that prices be always nonnegative is far from being just a modelling nuance. Rather, it may change the strategic interaction in the oligopoly in a crucial way, and may lead to equilibrium non-existence even in well-behaved industries.
We present examples of duopolies with di¤erential information without a Bayesian
Cournot equilibrium, where, notably, the market demand and cost functions in every state of nature have properties that under complete information would have led to equilibrium existence. In our examples 1 and 2 the inverse demand is a decreasing linear or concave function in each state of nature, which is truncated where it intercepts the horizontal axis so as to preserve the non-negativity of prices; the costs are linear too. In addition, the information structure is very simple: one …rm is better informed than the other. Yet, these industries possess no Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. In the industries de…ned in examples 1 and 2 a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium exists if the demand is not truncated (and thus negative prices are possible) 4 . In terms of …rms'incentives, the reason why these equilibria cease to be such when the demand is truncated is simple: whereas deviations from equilibrium to large outputs are deterred by the possibility of negative prices, when the demand is truncated such deviations may become pro…table. Indeed, if a …rm has high-demand and low-demand states in a certain information set, and the possibility of negative prices is ruled out, it is sometimes pro…table to increase output in that information set. This deviation will increase revenue in high-demand states, but lead only to limited losses in low-demand states, where the revenue cannot fall below zero.
The simplicity and robustness of examples 1 and 2 indicate that Bayesian Cournot equilibrium existence with always non-negative prices is a much scarcer phenomenon than existence when negative prices are allowed to arise (and thus also scarcer than the existence in the complete information case) 5 . When negative prices are possible 4 Despite this possibility, prices in an equilibrium are positive in every state of nature. 5 Note that in the complete information scenario, truncation of the inverse demand does not (which is admittedly somewhat less interesting), equilibrium exists quite often. In this case, linearity or concavity of the inverse demand, or more generally Novshek (1985) condition or concavity of the monopoly revenue, can be assumed to hold for all possible aggregate ouputs at every state of nature, which guarantees a good behavior of the expected payo¤ functions as well (e.g., concavity in each …rm's strategy, or cardinal submodularity 6 ). This can be used to establish equilibrium existence in the possibly negative prices scenario by arguments similar to those of the topological and lattice approaches in the complete information case, as we do in our theorems 1A and 1B.
If one insists on always non-negative prices, then, typically, linearity or concavity of the inverse demand or Novshek's condition cannot hold on the entire R + . Imposing these conditions only until the state-dependent inverse demand reaches zero, and then truncating it, is but one way to guarantee always non-negative prices. Other On the front of uniqueness, it turns out that even a simple duopoly may have multiple Bayesian Cournot equilibria -see example 4. However, we show that in an oligopoly with two types of …rms in which one type has superior information, whenever a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium exists, it must be unique -see theorems 6 These cardinal properties, if satis…ed in every state by the state-dependent payo¤ function, are preserved by the expectation operator, and thus the expected payo¤ functions inherit them.
As we noted above, this is not the case with quasi-concavity. Similarly, we do not consider Amir 
Cournot Competition with Incomplete Information
Consider an industry where a set of …rms, N = f1; 2; :::; ng ; compete in the production of a homogeneous good. There is uncertainty about the market demand and the production costs. This uncertainty is described by a …nite set of states of nature, together with a probability measure on ; which represents the common prior belief of the …rms about the distribution of the realized state. 7 The information of the …rms about the state of nature may be incomplete: the private information of …rm i 2 N is given by a partition i of into disjoint sets. For any ! 2 ; i (!) denotes the information set of i given !; that is, the element of i that contains !: W.l.o.g., we
assume that has full support on ; that is, ( i (!)) > 0 for every i 2 N and
If q i (!) denotes the quantity of the good produced by …rm i in state ! 2 ; and
given by
where P (!; ) is the inverse demand function in !, and c i (!; ) is the cost function
We assume throughout that: 7 The assumption that is …nite is not necessary, and is made only to simplify the presentation -see Remark 2.
(i) For every ! 2 and i 2 N; c i (!; ) is continuous, and satis…es c i (!; 0) = 0 (i.e., there are no …xed costs).
(ii) For every ! 2 ; P (!; ) is non-increasing, and for every ! 2 there exists a level of aggregate output Q (!) 2 [0; 1] such that for every Q < Q (!)
and
is …nite, it is referred to as the horizontal demand intercept in !:
There exists a level of output Z < 1 such that for every i 2 N; q Z and
i.e., in every state of nature each …rm's monopoly pro…t is non-positive when its output exceeds Z: If Q (!) < 1 for every ! 2 , and cost functions are non-decreasing, one may take Z max !2 Q (!) : Also, if the monopoly revenue function qP (!; q) has a maximum and the cost functions are strictly increasing and convex, such a Z exists.
A (pure) strategy for …rm i is a function q i : ! R + that speci…es its output in every state of nature, subject to measurability with respect to i's private information (i.e., q i is constant on every information set of …rm i). The set of strategies of …rm i will be denoted by B ( ; i ) : Given a strategy pro…le q = (q 1 ; ::
the expected pro…t of …rm i is
A strategy pro…le q 2 Q n j=1 B ( ; j ) a (pure strategy Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium, if no …rm …nds it pro…table to unilaterally deviate to another strategy, i.e., if for every i 2 N and q where (q j q i ) stands for the pro…le of strategies which is identical to q in all but the ith strategy, which is replaced by q i : This is equivalent to requiring
for every ! 2 : Here E(g( ) j A) stands for the expectation of a random variable g conditional on event A. ; and the probability of ! 2 is Since the marginal revenue of …rm 1 in ! 1 is always below its marginal cost, maximizing pro…ts entails that …rm 1 produces zero in this state. Thus, in looking for an equilibrium we restrict attention to those strategies of …rm 1, q 1 2 B( ; 1 ); that prescribe producing zero in ! 1 ; i.e., q 1 can be identi…ed with a scalar x q 1 (! 2 ) 2 R + :
Also, since …rm 2 does not know the realized state, a strategy of …rm 2, q 2 2 B( ; 2 ); must specify the same output in both states of nature; i.e., q 2 can be identi…ed with
Accordingly, the strategies of …rms 1 and 2
will be regarded as scalars x,y 2 R + : By identifying …rms' strategies with scalars
x; y we have in e¤ect converted the incomplete information duopoly into a complete information game where the payo¤s are the …rms'expected pro…ts.
In order to understand the source of the existence problem in this example, we begin by showing that if the demand functions are not truncated, and hence prices may be negative, then the industry has a Cournot equilibrium. We proceed then to modify the analysis to account for the impact of truncating the demand, and we show then that no Cournot equilibrium exists in the industry. Therefore, assume for the moment that the inverse demand is
and for (x; y) 2 R 2 + denote by U i (x; y) the corresponding payo¤ of …rm i 2 f1; 2g:
Since …rm 1 only produces in ! 2 ; we have
The payo¤ of …rm 2 is
where
is …rm 2's "expected residual inverse demand." We modify now the analysis to account for the demand truncation, i.e., we revert from (5) to (4) . Figure 2a below shows a graph of the residual inverse demand functions faced by …rm 2. The expected residual demand faced by …rm 2 is now
i.e.,
P (y); if 1 x + y and y 4; 0; if y > 4;
Note that P x (y) is not a concave function. Firms'payo¤s are given for (x; y) 2 R
Figure 2b below shows the graph of U 2 (x; ) for x = 99=100: (The graph of U 2 (x; ) has a similar form for every x:) Note that U 2 (x; ) is non-quasi-concave, despite the fact that the state-dependent payo¤ functions are quasi-concave; and that it has two local maxima. The local maximum of U 2 (x; ) on the left is given by
The local maximum of U 2 (x; ) on the right is …rm 2's maximum payo¤ when the price in state ! 2 is zero, given by max y fP (y)y y 100 g = 144 625 :
The smallest solution to the equation ) is the global maximum of U 2 (x; ) -that is, in this case …rm 2 is better o¤ choosing the output that maximizes its pro…t in ! 1 , letting the price be zero in ! 2 :
Firm 1's reaction functions is R 1 (y) = R 1 (y); and …rm 2's reaction correspondence is given by A graph of …rms' reaction functions is given in Figure 2c below. The jump of R 2 at x is caused by the change of the global maximizer of
: Thus, the best response correspondence R 2 is not convex-valued. As the graphs of R 1 and R 2 show, these functions do not cross, and therefore a Cournot equilibrium does not exist. In example 1, …rm 2's lack of information about the demand intercept Q leads to a non-concave expected residual inverse demand function, as shown in …gure 2a. As a result, the expected revenue of …rm 2 is not quasi-concave in its own output, and its reaction correspondence is not convex-valued. This causes equilibrium non-existence.
However, as we shall see in section 5, example 3, a linear duopoly where Q is known to both …rms does possess a Cournot equilibrium.
Next we present an example of a duopoly in which the demand intercept Q is the same in all states of nature (and hence known to both …rms), but nonetheless a Cournot equilibrium does not exist. This duopoly is a variation of that described The demand intercept is now constant, Q(! 1 ) = Q(! 2 ) = 1; and thus known to both …rms.
The expected residual inverse demand faced by …rm 2, P x (y); is given by
(1 x y) ; if x + y 1 and y 99 100 Let (x; y) 2 R 2 + : As in example 1, since …rm 1 produces zero in ! 1 its payo¤ is
Firm 2's payo¤ is U 2 (x; y) = P x (y) y y 100 : Figure 3b show graphs of …rm 2's expected payo¤ U 2 (x; ) for x = 22=100. Note that
; ) is not quasi-concave. (This stands in contrast to the case of …rm 2 being a monopoly: U 2 (0; ) is a quasi-concave function, which is, moreover, concave on [0; 1] :)
The reaction function of …rm 1 is also as in example 1, whereas …rm 2's reaction function is now The following condition on the inverse demand is akin to the collation of (2) and ( (A) For every ! 2 ; P (!; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and satis…es
for every Q 2 R + : (At Q = 0 we have in mind the right-side derivatives of P and P 0 :) Inequality (9) in condition A is equivalent to the requirement that the marginal revenue of a …rm be decreasing in the aggregate output of the other …rms. It is satis…ed, e.g., by all decreasing, concave, and twice continuously di¤erentiable inverse demand functions.
Theorem 1A. A duopoly that satis…es (i)-(iii) and A has a Cournot equilibrium.
When the …rms'cost functions have additional standard properties, we can consider condition B below, which is weaker than A (since the inverse demand is a non-increasing function).
(B) For every ! 2 ; P (!; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and the monopoly revenue function QP (!; Q) is concave, i.e.,
for every Q 2 R + :
Theorem 1B. An oligopoly that satis…es (i)-(iii) and B, and in which c i (!; ) is convex for every i 2 N and ! 2 ; has a Cournot equilibrium.
Theorems 1A and 1B are natural counterparts of results on existence of Cournot equilibrium that have been obtained in the literature in the complete information case (see, e.g., Novshek (1985) and Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) ). It is the nice behavior of the expected payo¤ functions that stands behind equilibrium existence in our theorems. Indeed, the proofs reveal that under condition A the pro…t function of each …rm is cardinally submodular in its output and the aggregate output of the other …rms, and if the …rms'cost functions are convex (as in theorem 1B), then the expected pro…t function of each …rm is concave in its strategy -see section 6.1 in the appendix. Both concavity and cardinal submodularity imply existence of a Cournot equilibrium via known methods (that we dubbed the "lattice" and the "topological" approaches in the Introduction).
Theorem 1A considers only duopolies. This is because it is not known whether cardinal submodularity of the expected payo¤ functions implies equilibrium existence when there are more than two …rms (except when the strategy sets are onedimensional, see Kukushkin (1994) ). However, when convexity of cost functions is assumed, as in theorem 1B, existence of a Cournot equilibrium is guaranteed for any number of …rms.
As was already mentioned, any non-increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable and concave P (!; ) satis…es condition A, and thus satis…es condition B too. It might be tempting to contemplate an alternative to A or B that would require that each P (!; ) be log-concave. Such condition is used by Amir (1996) to prove existence of Cournot equilibrium in a duopoly when information is complete. However, this does not appear to be a viable alternative, since the log-concavity of P (!; ) only implies the reverse single crossing property of the state-dependent revenue function, and this property would not typically be passed to the expected revenue function.
With a decreasing and concave P (!; ), prices are negative for aggregate outputs Consider a non-negative inverse demand function P , i.e., a function that satis…es P (!; Q) 0 for all ! 2 and Q 2 R + . Since for every ! 2 ; P (!; ) is nonincreasing by assumption (ii), for Q Q (!) we have
(Recall that Q (!) is the horizontal demand intercept.) Of course, we may have Q (!) = 1; as in the class of inverse demand functions described in remark 1. But, if Q (!) is …nite; then (11) implies that the inverse demand is …xed at zero beyond
The analogs of Novshek's condition A; or the revenue concavity condition B;
will now be used in conjunction with the requirement that the inverse demand be a non-negative function. These conditions must now be restated in the form that makes them consistent with (11) . (In what follows; the conditions and assumptions on derivatives of P (!; ) refer to one-sided derivatives at the endpoints of the interval The following condition is used in theorems 2A and 2B below.
(C) There exists a pro…le of state-dependent thresholds of output q 2
and for every strategy pro…le q 2 Y n i=1 B ( ; i ) and every i 2 N there exists a strategy r
Intuitively, condition C implies that each …rm i does not want to produce too much, since by reducing its output below the level q i its expected pro…t does not decrease.
The following two results are the counterparts of theorems 1A and 1B in section 4, stated now for oligopolies with always non-negative prices.
Theorem 2A. A duopoly satisfying conditions (i)-(iii), A 0 and C has a Cournot equilibrium.
Theorem 2B. An oligopoly satisfying conditions (i)-(iii), B 0 and C, and such that c i (!; ) is convex for every i 2 N and ! 2 ; has a Cournot equilibrium. 10 The function P (!; ) need not (and typically will not) be di¤erentiable at Q (!) : If Q (!) = 1 then the inequality is assumed on the entire R + ; i.e., conditions A 0 or B 0 become A or B, respectively. 11 Here and henceforth, we use the notation h g (for h; g : ! R + ) if and only if h (!) g (!)
for every ! 2 :
When …rms produce below the thresholds q 
, and
for every i 2 N; every ! 2 and every strategy q i that exceeds q i on i (!) :
In example 3 below we apply theorem 2A to a duopoly with linear demand, and
show that a Cournot equilibrium exists provided the demand intercept Q is known to both …rms.
Example 3 (A duopoly with a linear demand and complete information on the demand intercept). Suppose that n = 2: Let ; : ! R ++ be strictly positive functions. Assume that 2 B ( ; 1 ) \ B ( ; 2 ) ; where 1 and 2 are information endowments of the duopolists. Suppose that for any ! 2
and that the cost functions satisfy (i) and are non-decreasing. Here Q = : Since is both 1 -and 2 -measurable, both …rms know the demand intercept in every state of nature. This is a crucial di¤erence with example 1, where Q was not measurable with respect to the information partition of …rm 2, and a Cournot equilibrium does not exist. Here, the measurability Q = with respect to both partitions leads to a di¤erent conclusion.
is the revenue maximizing monopoly output level, since the …rms know and the demand is linear on [0; ], and thus no …rm will exceed 1 2 in any best response. Therefore condition C holds, and the duopoly has a Cournot equilibrium by theorem 2A.
The following theorem is a counterpart to theorem 1C when the inverse demand is a non-negative function. It establishes conditions that guarantee that, when a Cournot equilibrium exists, it is also unique.
Theorem 2C. Consider an oligopoly satisfying conditions (i), (iii), A 0 and U .
Also assume that for every ! 2 ; P (!; ) is strictly decreasing on [0; Q(!)]; where Q is a strictly positive and 2 -measurable function, 12 and each c i (!; ) is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable and convex for i 2 N . If a Cournot equilibrium exists (e.g., under conditions of theorems 2A or 2B), then it is unique.
In example 3 we established existence of a Cournot equilibrium for a duopoly with linear demand, provided the demand intercept Q is known to both …rms. If in addition we assume that 1 is …ner than 2 ; and that the state-dependent costs are strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable and convex, then by theorem 2C this duopoly's Cournot equilibrium is unique. The next example shows that in theorem 2C we cannot dispense with condition U .
Example 4 (Non-Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium when no Firm Has Superior
Information). Consider a duopoly in which consists of three states, ! 1 , ! 2 ; and ! 3 ; each one is chosen by nature with equal probability. Firms'information partitions are nature …rms face the same quadratic inverse demand function
Thus, …rms know the inverse demand in every state of nature, but have incomplete information about their costs. 13 Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 1 100 in states ! 1 and ! 2 , while its marginal cost is 2 in ! 3 : Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1 100 in states ! 1 and ! 3 , while its marginal cost is 2 in ! 2 :
Since in ! 3 the marginal revenue of …rm 1 is always below its marginal cost, …rm 1 produces zero in this state in any best response. Similarly, …rm 2 produces zero in ! 2 in any best response. It follows that each …rm i's strategy q i can, without loss of generality, be identi…ed with a scalar: q 1 can be viewed as the quantity x produced by …rm 1 in state ! 1 (and thus also in ! 2 ); and q 2 as the quantity y produced by …rm 2 in state ! 1 (and thus also in ! 3 ).
We claim that both q = (x ; y ) = 3 10 p 2; The maximum of Since producing more than 1 would yield a negative expected pro…t, we have shown that …rm 2 will not deviate unilaterally from q : By symmetry, the same holds for …rm 1, and thus q is indeed a Cournot equilibrium.
We show next that q is a Cournot equilibrium. For y 2 [1 x ; 1] the expected pro…t of …rm 2, 
Since P (!; ) is continuously di¤erentiable, this condition is equivalent to
for every x 1 x 2 0 and y 2 0: This condition, in turn, is equivalent (since P 0 (!; )
is also continuously di¤erentiable by condition A) to
for every x 2 0 and y 2 0: However, (16) is implied by assumption (ii) and condition
From (15) The proof is a direct consequence of the Nash existence theorem. First, for each
is concave in strategies of …rm i. Indeed, the second deriv-
; which is non-positive as follows from assumption (ii) and condition
The expected pro…t function U i clearly inherits concavity in q i from u 
Proof of theorem 1C
Since all conditions of theorem 1B are satis…ed, the oligopoly has at least one Cournot equilibrium. We will show that it is unique.
Let q be a Cournot equilibrium, and pick a …rm i: Since
is maximized (and in particular locally maximized) at q i = q i for every ! 2 ; the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satis…ed:
for every ! in which q i > 0; and
for every ! in which q i = 0:
Note that for each ! 2 the function
is decreasing in q and non-increasing in Q when q Q: Indeed,
(c i ) 00 (!; q) < 0 since P is strictly decreasing and c is convex by assumption, and @F @Q = qP 00 (!; Q)+P 0 (!; Q) 0 as follows from P (!; ) being decreasing and condition
A. Now suppose that q and q are two Cournot equilibria: That F is decreasing in q and non-increasing in Q implies that one cannot have q i ; Q < q i ; Q or q i ; Q > q i ; Q (inequality in both coordinates and strict inequality in the …rst coordinate) on any atom i (!) of i : This is because otherwise conditions (18) and (19) would not hold simultaneously for max ((q i ; Q ) ; (q i ; Q )). To summarize, any …rm's equilibrium strategy and the aggregate output in equilibrium cannot move in the same direction: q i ; Q q i ; Q and q i ; Q q i ; Q
on any element of i .
We will next show that every Cournot equilibrium satis…es the equal treatment property, i.e., that strategies of …rms of the same type are equal. Indeed, if q is a Cournot equilibrium, and q i 6 = q j where i and j are …rms of the same type, then consider an n-tuple q obtained from q by interchanging i and j. Clearly, q is also a Cournot equilibrium. However, if i (!) 2 i is a set on which w.l.o.g. q i > q j = q i ;
then the obvious fact that Q = Q leads to contradiction with (20) . Thus, the equal treatment property holds in any Cournot equilibrium. Now suppose that q and q are Cournot equilibria in the oligopoly. We will show that they coincide. Due to the equal treatment property, Q (!) = jKj q 1 (!) + jM j q 2 (!) ; and it will su¢ ce to establish that q i = q i for i = 1; 2: If q 2 and q 2 are not equal everywhere, then there exists ! 2 such that w.l.o.g. We now claim that
Indeed, both Q and Q are measurable with respect to the information partition of the more informed …rm 1, and thus, if (23) does not hold, there is ! 00 2 2 (!) with
Strict inequality in (22) on 1 (! 00 ) 2 (!) together with (24) would contradict (20) , and thus q 1 = q 1 on 1 (! 00 ) : But then Q > Q on 1 (! 00 ) because of (21), contrary to the choice of ! 00 : Thus (23) must hold.
But now (21) and (23) contradict (20) . Thus, strategies q 2 and q 2 must coincide almost everywhere. Now, if q 1 di¤ers from q 1 on 1 (!) for some ! 2 , and w.l.o.g. We conclude that q 1 = q 1 as well.
Proof of theorems 2A and 2B
First, restrict strategy sets of each …rm i to be S i = 0; q i : Note that for every strategy pro…le q 2 S 1 ::: S n ; Q P n i=1 q i Q: Hence, strategy pro…les in To show that q is a Cournot equilibrium in the unrestricted oligopoly as well, we now prove that unilateral deviations of i to strategies outside S i are not pro…table.
Indeed, if q i is ith strategy which is not in S i ; then for some r such that 1 (!) 2 (! 0 ) and P j2M q j Q (> 0) on 2 (! 0 ) : Accordingly, there exists a …rm j 2 M with q j > 0 on 2 (! 0 ) ; and just as before this means that j has a pro…table deviation from q on 2 (! 0 ) ; contradicting (3). We conclude that (26) holds.
But if q and q are two Cournot equilibria, it follows from (26) that q ; q ;
and all strategy pro…les close to them 16 have exactly the same properties as if the di¤erentiability condition in A 0 held for all Q 0 (i.e., as if A 0 had the original form A). We can therefore show that q and q coincide, just as in the proof of theorem 1C, using the …rst-order conditions derived from maximization of (17) . 16 What we have in mind are strategy pro…les that constitute, at each state of nature, small unilateral deviations from q or q : 
